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Abstract
This article argues that the African Union (AU) approach to peacebuilding, 
out of Africa’s historical experience and lessons from the United Nations 
(UN), is comprehensive and holistic, but requires the existence of a 
legitimate government, a functional society and domestic parties for 
dialogue to begin. Without these conditions, the approach leads to extended 
peace enforcement rather than peacebuilding. Yet, whatever the conditions 
that prevail, peacebuilding in Africa has experienced limited success due 
to the failure to fundamentally transform the inherited post-colonial 
state, society and politics. The neo-colonial conditions helped to stall the 
achievement of lasting peace. The African experience with peacebuilding 
demonstrates a need for a more fundamental peace than is internationally 
the norm – a peace paradigm that hinges on the continued decolonisation 
of the African state and society in order to give rise to what may be called 
a decolonial peace.
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The African Union (AU) approach to peacebuilding is an outcome of 
African experience with peace missions and lessons from the global 
environment, especially the United Nations (UN). Murithi correctly 
indicates how discussions about peace efforts in Africa have focused on 
actions, successes and failures since the formation of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) and sees them as part of the institutionalisation of 
pan-African ideals of prosperity for all, peace, development, self-reliance, 
freedoms and liberation (Murithi 2008:17). This gives the AU approach 
a fundamental uniqueness: its birth in a particular historical experience, 
its particular experiences of the structures of power and life that make up 
modernity/coloniality, and its aspirations born on the periphery of the 
world system we live in today. A major part of this peacebuilding agenda 
is contained in the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework 
(NEPAD 2005). The incomplete transition of Africa from colonial to post-
colonial, resulting in the persistence of neo-colonial conditions, must be 
born in mind when analysing efforts at peacebuilding in Africa. This leads 
to what Ndlovu-Gatsheni terms ‘neocolonised postcolonial’ conditions 
where peace and development remain elusive for ordinary Africans 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013:3). 
By decolonial (Grosfoguel 2009:10) peace we imply the pursuit of peace 
in a manner that also deals with the colonial continuities in the nature 
of the inherited state, with its underlying paradigm of war and violence, 
its coloniser model of the world and its colonial political economy. These 
continue to haunt post-colonial African societies. The concept is derived 
from the rich literature in decoloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015:28), a 
family of theories that places on the discussion table the critical importance 
of decommissioning the underpinnings of the colonial order of things, 
including neo-colonialism, and pursuing decoloniality as an imperative 
for the achievement of full liberation in the global South. Decolonial peace 
forms part of the number of conditions that describe what the literature 
calls the decolonial turn, namely: decolonial ethics of co-existence, 
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political economy, power, being and love, among others (Mignolo and 
Escobar 2010; Maldonado-Torres 2006; Grosfoguel 2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2013). So, this article seeks a departure from Eurocentric worldviews in 
the mainstream literature on peacebuilding that discount the fundamental 
problem of coloniality and constrain the transition to lasting peace and 
prosperity in African conf lict situations. The article does not dwell on 
explaining the underlying paradigm of violence that lies at the foundation 
of the Westernised modern world since the late 15th century and how this 
has remained in place because of the incomplete process of decolonisation 
of power, knowledge and being. Though this is important, it is a subject 
that requires a full article on its own. 
This article rather focuses on the contention that although the AU has 
innovated in useful ways in peacebuilding, the failure to fundamentally 
transform the inherited neo-colonial African society (including the state) 
limits the achievement of decolonial peace. Africans’ experiences with 
centuries of structural violence and its manifestation in intra- and inter-
state conf lict demonstrate the need for a focus on a more fundamental 
peace than is internationally the norm. It requires a shift towards a peace 
paradigm that promotes the continued decolonisation of the African state 
and society in order to give rise to what we call decolonial peace. 
It moves from the premise that peace efforts undertaken both by the AU 
and regional economic communities have a fundamental weakness arising 
from the fact that they take as given the colonial/neo-colonial state and 
economy established through violent processes of conquest, colonisation 
and domination; they envisage peace without the decommissioning of the 
underlying logics of coloniality and its support for perpetual and repeated 
violence. As a result, these initiatives register progress in peacebuilding 
that are reversible and fragile because the heritage of structural violence 
remains in place under neo-colonial arrangements first set in place at 
independence. Decolonial peace is similar to the act of detoxing a body 
while applying measures to heal diseases that nest in toxic conditions. 
This detoxing (decolonisation) is a long complex process that began as 
indigenous resistance to colonial conquest, and later developed into the 
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rebellions against colonial rule, the achievement of independence and now 
the search for alternatives to Western ways of achieving noble purposes of 
peace, development and justice. 
On this basis, the idea of African solutions to African problems becomes 
meaningless because African problems are neither originated nor sustained 
by African sources. Therefore solutions will require the decommissioning 
of the colonial structures that underpin African problems, structures that 
are actually global in their nature. For instance, Madagascar’s incessant 
conf lict is not purely about what Malagasy political actors do or do not 
do, but also its entanglement with imperial designs of France which have 
not ceased in spite of independence in the 1960s. The very idea of the AU 
and regional economic communities seeking to take control of their desti-
nies implies a rebellion against the structures of coloniality that reproduce 
colonial conditions of dependence, violence, divisions, illusions and other 
factors in the conf lict. Perhaps it is utopian to believe that a completely 
transformed society will come to exist, but Africa can make great progress 
towards a decolonial peace wherein the colonial condition is fundamen-
tally transformed.  
Elusive peace: What fundamentally is the problem?
Given the ubiquity of imported approaches to the subject of peace in 
Africa, this article must begin with a short discussion on the value of 
Africa-centred thinking on the whole problem at hand. Ali Mazrui thinks 
of Africa today as haunted by the curse of Berlin, referring to the 1884–5 
European partitioning of Africa into unviable states that embedded 
the paradigm of violence at the very foundation of African statehood, a 
paradigm Africa is struggling to disentangle itself from (Mazrui 2010:23). 
This produced what Ngugi wa Thiong’o calls deep dismemberment that 
has defied efforts at unity, peace and development long after independence 
(Wa Thiong’o 2009). For him, this is partly because the African elite that 
took over were brought up in that same Euro-North American modernity 
which fashioned the current African condition. For this reason, efforts 
at peace, development and liberation without re-memberment of Africa 
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at various levels have only helped provide for temporary respites rather 
than lasting solutions. It is in this analytical context that we consider the 
AU’s approach to peacebuilding and its efficacy in fulfilling the African 
dream of peace, where peace means removing the gangrene that set in 
centuries ago and keeps manifesting as resurgences of conf lict, poverty 
and despair (Césaire 1972). Peace is about a fundamental shift from the 
paradigm of violence at the root of the African states to a paradigm of peace 
that fosters the African renaissance (Du Bois 1953). Therefore, it is at the 
same time a process of decolonising the African colonial condition whose 
roots are a violent conquest and domination as well as the neo-colonial 
realities of post-colonial Africa. The article therefore makes a distinction 
between peace within coloniality, which amounts to mere silence of guns 
within a state founded in violence, and decolonial peace, which implies 
peace achieved by transforming the fundamentals on which the modern/
neo-colonial state and society in Africa are founded. It is peace pursued 
alongside decolonisation of power, statehood, and state-citizen relations. 
This article will show that, while there are unique innovations by Africa 
in peacebuilding, they come short of this transition to decolonial peace 
because the African political class has lacked the courage, imagination and 
revolutionary consciousness to decommission the inherited modern state, 
its economy and ways of being in order to invent a new African political 
reality suitable for sustainable, fundamental and lasting peace (Nzongola-
Ntalanja 1987:ix). 
Continental peace architecture: The basis of AU 
peacebuilding
When the AU was born, conflict patterns were starting to change from 
inter-state towards greater incidence of intra-state conflict (Olympio 
2004:109–112). New key factors of conflict also emerged, such as: 
ethnicisation of political and power struggles, competition over scarce 
resources and access to state power, violence fuelled by proliferation of 
small arms, armed groups influenced by politico-religious ideologies, and 
secession-seeking groups who wished to leave their nation states (Bujra 2002). 
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This revealed the underlying problem of the failure of the African state to 
protect and provide for its population. It became a state that was fragile 
and without full control over the whole of its territory. Rebel groups and 
militia could thrive outside protected capital cities and resourced towns. 
It turned out that this state was elitist, factionalist, tribalist, militaristic and 
autocratic, implicated more in oppressing and brutalising its people than 
offering social and economic development or ensuring security or building 
peace.1 It is in this context that the AU refined and expanded the OAU 
experience with peace missions, to build its approach to peacebuilding, 
but this remains a work in progress. 
The continental peace architecture provides an institutional framework 
for implementing the concept of a comprehensive peace that encompasses 
conf lict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conf lict recon-
struction and peacebuilding. At the pinnacle of this architecture is the AU 
Peace and Security Council (PSC) established in 2004 with ten members 
elected for two-year terms and five for three-year terms in order to provide 
some stability and continuity to the Council’s leadership. The focus of the 
PSC is similar to that of the OAU Central Organ, i.e. to prevent and resolve 
conf licts by monitoring potential security threats throughout the continent 
(Baregu 2011:14–25). It sends fact-finding missions and can authorise AU 
interventions in the form of peace envoys, observer missions, mediators, 
good offices, technical support teams, and armed forces to keep peace 
after agreements. Article 7(e) of the Protocol Relating to Establishment of 
the Peace and Security Council operationalises the AU Constitutive Act’s 
principle of non-indifference by empowering the Council to recommend 
military interventions for authorisation by the AU Assembly in cases of 
crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes (African Union 2002). 
This is a new dynamic in Africa’s peace agenda – a continental decision-
making platform for peacebuilding plus the principle of non-indifference 
towards violence within states. Its success will be related to whether and 
1 There is a large literature on this failure to transform the state. See, for instance, Nzongola-
Ntalanja 1987; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013; Nkrumah 1965.
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how the continent manages to undo the curse of Berlin which infects the 
states, the economies and society in general. Otherwise, this architecture 
will be remembered only for its great promise rather than its actual effect 
on the ground.
AU-Regional Economic Communities (RECs) interface
The African Standby Force consists of five regional brigades and enables 
the AU to intervene in a coordinated fashion in a conf lict situation. 
In this regard, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community 
of Central African States (ECASS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 
have responsibilities to make, secure and build peace in the regions. 
In this way, the AU framework for peacebuilding encourages regions to 
take responsibility for peacebuilding in conf lict situations; thus the AU 
implements the principle of subsidiarity in order to build the capability 
of RECs to ensure peace in the regions (Adibe 2003:105–114). No other 
continent in the world uses regional structures for peacebuilding in the 
same fashion.   
The SADC role in successful peace processes in Madagascar, Lesotho and 
Zimbabwe is a case in point. It took the lead in facilitating mediation 
processes, in deploying security forces in the case of Lesotho to secure 
peace, and in peacebuilding measures like training, confidence building 
and humanitarian assistance. Its leaders reported regularly to the AU PSC 
where they also sought endorsement of their peacebuilding efforts and 
looked for refreshed mandates; and the AU relied heavily on the ability of 
the region to provide political, security and financial resources to these 
peace processes. As a result, the burden of supplying resources shifted to 
the regional organisation whereas in many other peace missions, the AU 
shoulders the bulk of the burden with the help of outsiders. The analysis 
shows that this devolution of peacebuilding responsibilities strengthened 
the capacity of the regional organisation to respond swiftly to prevent, 
manage and resolve conf lict for purposes of building permanent peace 
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(Zondi and Khaba 2014:1–17; Zondi 2013:49–79). The recent work of the 
EAC in bringing peace back to Burundi in 2015 (ICG 2016) and the IGAD 
role in facilitating South Sudan’s peace negotiations after a devastating 
civil war in 20162 vindicate the AU approach of devolving responsibility 
for peacebuilding to regional organisations closest to the situations. In all 
occasions, the impact is, among others, a stronger capacity to building peace 
at the regional levels. It is an approach that is designed to help strengthen 
regions and promote a regional integration that transcends the limitations 
of involved nation states with their logics of power as dominance rather 
than cooperation (Adejumobi 1998:29–53). 
But there is uneven performance and effect in the AU-RECs vertical 
coordination for peacebuilding with some RECs, like SADC and EAC, 
showing signs of maturity in taking responsibility for peace in their 
respective regions, while others, like ECCAS and Communauté Économique 
et Monétaire des États de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), struggle in the 
absence of a willing and capable state or two to underwrite regional 
agency. Of course, the AMU remains moribund as a result of the broader 
geopolitical contestations over the Mediterranean and the Saharawi 
question. The pursuit of opportunities arising from the principle of 
subsidiarity in the AU Constitutive Act requires a willing and able set of 
leaders motivated by common good, but not all regions have this advantage. 
Secondly, the AU-RECs interface still suffers from poor coordination, the 
AU having failed to develop mechanisms to coordinate implementation of 
its decisions at regional levels and to assist regions to communicate their 
interests to the AU (Obouga 2016).3 The envoys now exchanged between 
the regions and the AU have poorly defined roles, and very little of this is 
about ensuring cohesion between the two levels of governance. Thirdly, 
there is still limited horizontal coordination and harmonisation among 
2 For reflections of the UN Security Council’s Expert Panel on this, see United Nations 
Security Council 2015.
3 For a ground-breaking critical analysis of these peace efforts from below, see Maphosa and 
others 2014.
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RECs and as a result there is no notable case of REC-REC coordination of 
a peace initiative. Fourthly, the RECs require well-developed institutional 
mechanisms to deliver on the promise of regional responsibility for peace, 
which includes the full operationalising of standby forces, institutions for 
political coordination of peace efforts, capacities for mediation and peace-
making, and structures for driving regional post-conf lict rebuilding. For 
instance, while ECOWAS established the long-awaited Mediation Support 
Division in the ECOWAS Commission only in 2015, other elements of 
the peace architecture – as the Mali crisis of 2012 showed – including an 
early warning capability, a rapid military response force and post-conf lict 
peacebuilding, remain work in progress (Odigie 2016).
There is room for building the capacity of RECs to take on the 
responsibility for peace in regions and between regions, but this is not yet 
a major consideration in the upper echelons of the AU Peace and Security 
Architecture. Part of the reason for this is that Africa is battling to overcome 
the curse of Berlin that is manifest in what Ngugi wa Thiong’o called dis-
memberment and what Mazrui called fragmentation of the African polity 
(Mazrui 2010:xii; Wa Thiong’o 2009:1–31). Until these weaknesses are 
remedied, the AU will be forced to rely on UN peacekeeping forces or 
former colonial powers like France to respond effectively to urgent security 
crises as it happened recently in Mali. Under these conditions, there can 
be no decolonial peace. A lasting peace must accompany the building of 
national unity, regional cohesion and continental integration – a set of 
conditions opposite to those arising from the curse of Berlin. 
The AU thinking and the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
Policy Framework
Many of the lessons learned from various experiments in peacebuilding 
during the latter years of the AU were integrated into the African Post-
Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework whose development began when 
in 2002 the implementation committee of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) decided that Africa’s peacebuilding approach 
would be an all-embracing strategy including a) restoring security; 
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b) managing political transition; c) anchoring socio-economic development; 
d) promoting human rights and justice; and e) resource mobilisation 
(NEPAD 2005). 
These five dimensions are designed to be mutually reinforcing and 
complementary. The AU believes that there is no need to place these in a 
sequence, because it does not accept the logic that you need one element 
to be fully in place before the next phase kicks in, as is often the case 
with the UN and Western approaches to peacebuilding. It is assumed in 
the mainstream literature that conf lict prevention, conf lict resolution, 
reconstruction, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding form a linear framework 
that must be followed in that order. Therefore, the actual implementation 
of this AU policy differs from one conf lict situation to another. The need to 
be context-specific and f lexible in implementing this policy is an important 
feature of the AU approach to peacebuilding. Central to the policy is the 
need to pursue security, development and peace simultaneously at all 
times. Yet, in practice the AU follows the Western and UN approaches 
that assume the sequencing of interventions from prevention to post-
conf lict reconstruction as both the 2003 Protocol Establishing the Peace 
and Security Council (Art. 20) and the policy framework referred to above 
suggest. Actually, the failure to deploy troops to quell terror attacks on 
Mali in 2013 (Aning 2016:120–33) and the failure to send troops alongside 
mediators in the Central African Republic illustrate the pitfalls of the 
commitment to a linear process of sequencing interventions (AU Election 
Observation Mission 2016). In this approach, the underlying sources of 
problems, including the inherited violent neo-colonial state, economy 
and organisation of society, are maintained, giving Africa only temporary 
respite from violence and/or a merely fragile peace. More than a decade 
ago, the literature already pointed to shallow peace processes that failed 
to transform the state and society so that they become pillars of peace and 
development (Baregu and Landsberg 2002:2). The following analyses of 
key AU peacebuilding interventions will enable us to determine whether 
the AU has evolved a unique approach to peacebuilding and, if so, what this 
implies for the renaissance of a peaceful and prosperous Africa.  
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The AU record of peace interventions
Burundi
The AU inherited from the OAU several peace interventions, the first being 
in Burundi where the OAU had been involved since 1994 in de-escalating 
conf lict, using good offices, peace envoys, esteemed mediators in Julius 
Nyerere and Nelson Mandela, peacekeeping and confidence-building 
measures (Muyangwa and Voigt 2000:10). The OAU had succeeded in 
bringing the parties to a power-sharing agreement in 2001 that led to a 
three-year transitional government. The AU got involved in April 2003, 
half-way through the transition, when the AU itself was barely a year 
old. The AU approach became apparent right at the beginning, with the 
establishment of a multi-disciplinary African Union Mission in Burundi 
(AMIB) deploying just over 3 000 troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique and 
South Africa to provide security for returning political activists and other 
refugees, and assist with the demobilisation of armed groups and general 
peacekeeping. A 43-member observer team was tasked with monitoring the 
implementation of the agreements. Political envoys in the form of former 
ambassadors were deployed to politically support the transition from one 
government to another through dialogues with all key political parties. 
An experienced diplomat, Mamadou Bah, was placed in charge of the entire 
mission with a largely political role to ensure a coordinated peacebuilding 
effort. The special representative in this model of peacebuilding is expected 
to be a peace envoy available on the ground to help the stakeholders resolve 
any issue that crops up, to promote the transformation of politics from 
acrimony to continuous dialogue and to catalyse the positive role of 
international actors on the ground. As Bah explained, the AU orientation 
was that the AMIB was focused on creating conditions for permanent peace 
and for development rather than merely silencing the guns (Interview 
with Amb. Mamadou Bah 2003). For this purpose, the AU focus was on 
continuous confidence-building measures to enable the affected country 
to sustain on its own the peace thus built. Central to this approach, the 
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AMIB mobilised the UN and donor agencies to support the rebuilding of 
state capacity to deliver development, fight natural calamities like drought 
and promote the country for international investments. 
Indeed, the UN played a critical role in reinforcing the AMIB even before 
the UN took over the control of the peace mission and converted it into 
the UN Operation on Burundi (ONUB) (Murithi 2008:75). With greater 
resources and lots of expertise in complex processes of demobilisation and 
reintegration of armed forces, the UN helped complete the AU efforts by 
demobilising thousands of armed persons. This laid the ground for the 
return to relative normalcy by 2009. However, the f lare up of conf lict in 
2015 when armed forces sought to suppress political activists opposed to 
attempts by President Pierre Nkurunziza to extend his presidential term 
taught the AU that it was not wise to see the election of a post-transition 
government as marking the end of a peacebuilding process. The AU has 
not been able to re-engage its peace mission and complete the process that 
was ended prematurely. It was left to the East African Community (EAC) 
to facilitate inclusive political negotiations between Nkurunziza and his 
nemesis. While the teaming up with the UN, the central role of the regional 
body (EAC) and the privileging of political dialogue distinguish the AU 
approach from the OAU and other international approaches, negotiations 
led to the bankrupt idea of elite pacts involving top leaders of major political 
parties. This elitism undermines the role of civil society actors, indigenous 
structures on the ground and the rooting of peace in communities.  
Somalia
The AU intervention in Somalia was conditioned by factors quite different 
from those that prevailed in Burundi because Somalia had experienced 
a complete collapse of government in the early 1990s and had become a 
complex den of militia-driven and terror-linked conf lict (Murithi 2008:81). 
Central to the AU approach was the OAU idea of establishing a transitional 
government with a semblance of stability in Somalia because the AU 
approach requires the establishment of a government to be at the centre of 
dialogue, stabilisation, legitimation of international interventions and to 
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be the institution to which peace missions hand over the task of building 
peace in the long run. Restoring constitutional normalcy is for the AU the 
basis for peace intervention and that is why it places so much emphasis 
on brokering a political agreement providing for transitional government. 
In this case, like the OAU, the AU bases its approach on the establishment 
of even a weak government. The AU supported the Inter-Governmental 
Authority for Development (IGAD) in its efforts to achieve peace through 
the establishment of several fragile transitional governments since 2003 and 
thus the whole peacebuilding endeavour has also appeared weak, stuck in its 
first phase (establishing a government and beginning political dialogues) 
and there are no clear prospects for the AU approach to find expression 
in Somalia under these conditions. Such an approach to Somalia took 
the form of the UN Security Council Resolution 1725 of December 2006. 
This is why the AU formally established the AU Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) in January 2007 with the usual mandate of political dialogue, 
constitution building, confidence building, coordination with international 
agencies and security sector reform. But the mission has hardly been able 
to go beyond very basic tasks of political dialogue and propping up a fragile 
transitional government. It has also focused on humanitarian assistance. 
Yet, the AU has gone on to seek UN Security Council mandate to give the 
IGAD-AU mission international legal standing. 
The UN deployed a force of 1 700 peacekeeping troops from Burundi, Ghana, 
Malawi, Nigeria and Uganda in 2009, to first secure a political dialogue 
called the Somali National Reconciliation Congress. Since then, however, it 
has mainly been focused on protecting the fragile transitional government 
and helping to contain the security threat posed by the emergence of 
Al-Shabaab militants (AU Peace and Security Council 2015). The mission 
seems stuck in its infancy. NATO powers increased military operations in 
Somalia in the name of the War on Terror, and have further complicated 
the situation, helping to deepen conf lict rather than reinforcing peace 
interventions. Therefore, the AU approach to peacebuilding has proved 
ill-suited to conditions where complex theatres of conf lict continue even 
during peace attempts. This international cooperation is essential for 
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conf lict resolution and subsequent peacebuilding in Somalia due to the 
entanglement of regional and extra-regional forces in problems facing 
Somalia. While the AU approach helped to contain the deteriorating 
security situation, it has not provided the conditions for peacebuilding 
further than relative stability or a security stalemate between government 
and militia. 
According to the Peace and Security Council Report for 2015, AMISOM 
struggled to make headway because there are no conditions for peace 
in Somalia. Weak government and violence involving Al-Shabaab and 
other militia mean that national dialogue towards some constitutional 
normalcy and transitional political arrangements cannot take root. Under 
these conditions, AMISOM has become a force focused on managing 
conf lict rather than keeping or building peace. AMISOM accepts that 
state formation, reconstruction of societal systems and the rebuilding 
of political processes are difficult to achieve in the absence of conf lict 
resolution (AU Peace and Security Council 2014). If this leads to a greater 
focus on rebuilding the state, state-civil society relations, strengthening 
indigenous structures of peace, and securing the integrity of the territory, 
it might lead to some progress towards peace in Somalia. 
Sudan
The AU peace intervention in Darfur in Sudan showcases a dimension of 
the AU peacebuilding approach which differs slightly from that in the cases 
outlined above, namely: co-ownership of the peace efforts between the AU 
and the UN. It is clear that this is an experiment born out of the realisation 
that without adequate financial and technical resources, international 
networks and the force of international law, good AU peacebuilding models 
will have a limited effect. As indicated earlier, the AU idea of peacebuilding 
is broadly similar to the UN peace framework. Of course, the AU approach 
takes peacebuilding as an overarching purpose of intervention rather than 
a phase that must only follow peacekeeping right at the end of the cycle of 
transformation from conf lict to peace. The AU sees continuous political 
dialogue, confidence building, and institution building as central from 
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beginning to the end of the peace processes. This is why cooperation with 
the UN tends to happen long after the AU started with peacebuilding.
The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was established in the year 
that the PSC was born, i.e. 2004. The mission was to minimise the impact 
of the conf lict between government forces, militias and rebel groups on 
civilian populations in Darfur as well as to secure the environment for 
political interventions aimed at finding peace agreements among key 
political actors. Fought largely through proxy forces like militia and armed 
bandits, this conf lict in western Darfur descended into deadly ethnic 
conf lict and banditry pitting indigenous Africans against Arabic Africans. 
The news of mass killings and the displacement of two million people 
from western Darfur led to the AU intervention through President Idris 
Deby of Chad in September 2003. This led to the Abeche Agreement signed 
by the main rebel group, Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM), and the 
government that agreed to observe a ceasefire, to disarm irregular armed 
groups and to provide a safe passage for humanitarian assistance (Murithi 
2008:81–82). 
From March 2004, the AU became fully involved in attempts to de-escalate 
the conf lict through a series of political negotiations seeking to ensure that 
all rebels and armed groups were involved in the peace agreements. It was 
also involved in confidence-building measures like facilitated dialogues 
among affected communities in the region. To give even more weight to 
this pressure for a peace agreement as basis for a structured AU peace 
mission, the then Chairperson of the AU Commission, President Alpha 
Konare, became directly involved in facilitating dialogue alongside other 
peace envoys. But this led only to another piecemeal agreement involving 
some and not all major players in the conf lict: the Humanitarian Ceasefire 
Agreement signed by SLM, the Justice and Equality Movement and the 
government. The terms agreed were similar to previous peace agreements 
mentioned above. At last, the AU was able to ensure that peace agreements 
allowed for humanitarian corridors, observer missions, and peace envoys 
to explore comprehensive and inclusive agreements. Thus, the AMIS 
was born with the hope that it would implement the AU peacebuilding 
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approach (Toga 2007:214–244). But this approach has been of limited effect 
on conditions on the ground because the government remains unwilling to 
enthusiastically support the AU or UN interventions and because there are 
many splinter militias left outside the complex peace agreements. 
The AU was central in peace negotiations designed to bring previously 
excluded actors within the fold of peace agreements, as in the talks that 
took place in Abuja, Nigeria. Each round concluded with a declaration of 
principles, which resulted in five agreements from five rounds of Abuja 
negotiations, showcasing the AU commitment to a patient nurturing of 
shared understanding and vision as the basis for agreements in cases where 
the situation was not on its own ripe for an agreement. The last round 
that took five months of facilitated negotiations culminated in the Darfur 
Agreement of May 2006. But it turned out that the agreement included 
only one faction of the SLM and excluded the JEM because both and a few 
others still believed that a military victory was more desirable and possible 
(Fadul and Tanner 2007:285). Under such conditions, the AU model on 
peacebuilding just does not work. 
The first three phases of AMIS (April–September 2004; October 2004–March 
2005; and April 2005 onwards) confronted challenges relating to operational 
unreadiness, poor planning, delays in deployment, weak supplies, and 
logistical deficiencies. Inadequate financing of the mission meant that it 
relied on Western funding for its essential capacities, thus undermining the 
pan-African ideal of self-reliance. The reliance on NATO to transport AU 
troops to Darfur between 2005 and 2007 meant that this Western military 
alliance was given legitimate presence on African soil. Thereafter NATO 
would not depart from the African space, and played a prominent role in 
the Western military campaigns against the government in Libya in 2011 
that led to the assassination of Muammar Qadaffi and undermined African 
diplomacy (NATO 2008; Campbell 2012:97–105). The AU peacebuilding 
approach has this serious weakness: it is one of those great African ideas that 
Africans cannot fund. They have to look to the West for finance, and this 
obviously brings divergent political visions, peace orientations and priorities 
which weaken the AU model to the point of failure.
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AMIS over time grew into a big military contingent made up by Nigeria 
(3 infantry battalions), Rwanda (3 infantry battalions), South Africa 
(1 infantry battalion, FHQ (Force Headquarters) Reserve, 1 engineer 
company), Senegal (1 infantry battalion), Kenya (1 Military Police 
Detachment), and Gambia (1 FHQ company) (Toga 2007:221). Late in 
2007, a hybrid mission between the AU and UN, called United Nations-
African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), replaced AMIS, 
further reinforcing this military force. This force proved crucial for the 
implementation and protection of humanitarian interventions, including 
the return of refugees in some areas, the resumption of economic activities 
in some villages and the prevention of further escalation of conf lict. 
It also provided extensive training and capacity support for national security 
and policing, but given the central role of government in the conf lict this 
formula was ill-advised and could not ensure better security for all and 
peace for the population. UNAMID became a greater hope for the people 
affected by conf lict than government. But in the process, the mission 
turned into peace enforcement rather than peacebuilding as defined by the 
AU. With peacekeepers dying regularly in skirmishes with armed groups 
that continue to fester in Darfur, UNAMID has become entangled in the 
no peace-no war stalemate in Darfur (Ekengard 2008:26–33). However, the 
holistic nature of the AU-UN approach in this case means that the mission 
is still of value for helping to avoid a further meltdown of security in 
this area.  
However, UNAMID has achieved in seven years not much more than AMIS 
did before it. This is because the conditions for peacebuilding simply did 
not change much under UNAMID’s watch. The government remained 
recalcitrant and rebel groups continued to hope for greater advantage in 
military confrontation than in peace dialogue. If preventing a deterioration 
of the security situation is an achievement, then AMIS and UNAMID have 
been a relative success. Otherwise, there has been no real progress on the 
conf lict resolution and post-conf lict peacebuilding fronts. Protracted 
mediated dialogues with various parties to the conf lict have also been 
harmed by poor coordination between Western actors imposing sanctions 
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and an arms embargo on the government and African actors trying to find 
a political settlement on the ground. If sanctions are the proverbial stick 
needed to support the diplomatic measures on the ground, then the two 
must be undertaken in a coordinated fashion. Mathew Leriche would make 
the same point. He found that Western-driven sanctions on South Sudan 
had by 2015 become obstacles to peace (Leriche 2015). 
Which factors contribute to the uniqueness of the AU 
peacebuilding approach?
‘Unique’ describes and specifies an approach to peacebuilding which is 
particularly African and born out of the African experience. This does 
not mean features that cannot be found in some form in peacebuilding 
outside Africa. But it does mean that these features are from Africa’s 
contribution to thinking and practice about peacebuilding. What is 
principally unique about the AU approach to peacebuilding is its historical 
genesis from peace initiatives driven by the OAU and then the AU. Part 
of it has to do with the contextualisation of central tenets of the UN’s 
Agenda for Peace. Methodologically speaking, we have learned from the 
writings of Archie Mafeje (2000:66–71), Georges Nzongola-Ntalanja 
(1987), Tiyambe Zeleza (2006), Molefi Asante (1990), Ngugi wa Thiong’o 
(1981) and Paulin Hountondji (1997) that the authenticity of what is 
African arises from the fact that Africa’s unique history presently produces 
particular African realities, thought patterns, approaches and orientations. 
This is true of all areas of public policy and politics including peacebuilding. 
No serious study of an African idea or reality can avoid the historical 
evolution of today’s realities. The following discussion is on the key tenets 
of the particular AU approach to peacebuilding. We begin with unique AU 
tenets of peacebuilding. 
An all-encompassing concept of peacebuilding is used 
The AU approach has benefitted from the comprehensiveness of the 
conceptual basis of its peace interventions. This mirrors the Agenda 
for Peace conceptual framework that sees four key pillars of the peace 
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agenda (prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding) as 
interconnected, interdependent and mutually reinforcing. The AU sees 
peace as linked to development as the basis of this framework. Therefore, 
the AU approach has benefited from this holistic approach to thinking 
about peace and this leads to comprehensive peace interventions.
In line with the comprehensiveness of the conceptual framework, the AU 
peace interventions are multi-disciplinary in the sense that they include 
capacities to anticipate, de-escalate, secure, monitor and support post-
conf lict development. The capacities to prevent conf lict, to resolve on-going 
conf lict, to protect peace processes and to build new and peaceful societies 
are central to the AU approach. Where there is a strong leadership on the 
ground in the form of a Special Representative or peace diplomat, and where 
there is strong coordination among key players in an AU peace mission, the 
chances for success are much enhanced. Challenges have arisen, however, 
when the AU peace intervention is undertaken after conf lict has broken out 
but before any meaningful peace process takes root, because it then gets 
translated into an endless peace enforcement intervention. 
AU intervention in domestic affairs is legally justified 
The qualitative difference between the OAU and AU approaches to 
peacebuilding is in the legal framework. Unlike the OAU Charter, the AU 
Constitutive Act permits intervention in member states in cases of crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and genocide. This removes the old problem 
where the pan-Africanist ideal of peace and prosperity is hampered by 
the Westphalian principle of non-intervention in national affairs. On this 
basis, having formally adopted the principle of non-indifference in Sirte, 
Libya, in 1999, two years before the idea of Responsibility to Protect was 
proposed by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, Africa is the first region to provide the legal framework for 
setting aside the principle of non-intervention in specific circumstances, 
before the international community adopted the principle of Responsibility 
to Protect. Therefore, the AU Constitutive Act, the Protocol establishing 
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the PSC and other decisions of the AU on peace provide a conducive legal-
political environment for comprehensive AU peace missions. This brings 
the AU’s concept of peacebuilding closer to the ideals of the Responsibility 
to Protect – towards which the world has been working.
It forms part of a Comprehensive African Peace Architecture
The establishment of a continental peace and security architecture with 
the PSC at the centre is an outcome of lessons learned in the latter years of 
the OAU when the Central Organ on security was established with positive 
effect in all major OAU peace interventions. The African Standby Force 
and its regional brigades in all five regions of the AU are meant to enable 
the AU to respond timeously to incidents of violence defined in Article 3 of 
the Protocol establishing the PSC. This provides the necessary institutional 
framework for the support of the peacebuilding interventions. 
It promotes AU-UN cooperation for peacebuilding 
Clearly, the cooperation between the UN and the AU in peacebuilding 
in Africa is positive for building and strengthening African capacity for 
peacebuilding as well as for boosting the UN interface with regional 
organisations in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity. The AU approach 
is to lay the ground for such cooperation through comprehensive peace 
missions of its own, focused on anticipating conflict hotspots, confidence 
building and peacekeeping. This is essential for African ownership of 
hybrid missions as well as for building African capacity for peacebuilding. 
The challenge is to develop a shared conceptual framework for the AU and UN. 
In spite of AU unconcern, its peacebuilding is supported by 
effective peace initiatives from below
The AU policies and protocols pay lip service to enabling citizen 
involvement in the implementation of AU programmes. The Post-Conf lict 
Development and Reconstruction policy does the same. As a result, efforts 
from below function mainly because citizens pursue them rather than 
because governments enable them. African civil society interventions for 
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peace are many and various. The most notable include the women-driven 
efforts that helped transform the situation from conf lict to a peace process 
in Liberia when organisations like the Women in Peace building Program 
(WIPNET), the Mano River Women of Peace Network (MARWOPNET) 
and Women Peace and Security Network Africa (WIPSEN-A) created 
a peace movement that politicians and rebel groups could not ignore. 
These formations remained vigilant enough to support social efforts to 
reintegrate demobilised fighters, build community centres for normalising 
community relations, provide counselling for the affected, engage in 
post-war community rebuilding, and convene dialogues to keep peace alive 
(UNIFEM 2007; Ecoma 2009; WIPSEN-Africa 2009). Such peacebuilding 
initiatives from below have enjoyed the support of intra-African and extra-
African civil society networks as well as structures of the UN like the 
UN-INSTRAW and UNWOMEN (Hendricks and Chivasa 2008). They have 
become crucial for pursuing the full implementation of UN Resolution 1325. 
This is all part of efforts at attaining peace from below, involving organs 
of civil society where women’s formations play a prominent role – efforts 
which have increased in number, scale and impact. This is in spite of a 
political, security, and legal environment that discourages the involvement 
of formations from below in AU-driven peacebuilding projects (Maphosa 
et al. 2014). 
Which factors impair the uniqueness of African 
peacebuilding?
Over-reliance on external funding for peacebuilding
The reliance on former colonial powers and other external forces for financial 
and technical resources seriously undermine the AU’s peacebuilding. 
‘Borrowed waters do not quench one’s thirst’ is an African proverb that 
supports the pan-African ideal of self-reliance. Thus, dependence on 
external financing of peacebuilding defeats the very purpose of the AU 
approach. We have shown that the AU approach is founded on African 
renaissance and on the ideals of decolonising the world; but these ideals 
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cannot be achieved while allowing Western powers space to inf luence what 
Africa thinks and does to this end. The failure of the AU to finance its 
programmes generally and the inability of many of its member states to 
finance their regular budgets is a major threat to the second decolonisation 
of Africa and its aim to finish the incomplete process of liberating the 
continent. This resource problem points to a fundamental weakness in the 
post-colonial African condition, and is a serious contributor to the post-
colonial realities of deferred dreams, shattered expectations and illusions 
of change. Over-reliance on generous European Union funding mainly and 
other external donors means that AU’s peacebuilding is not sustainable and 
cannot be considered to be fully sovereign and African. Assistance from 
the UN is better because the UN is an inclusive global organisation, but it 
still can be a conduit of imperial designs of the few dominant powers in the 
world, as happened when the UN played a problematic role alongside France 
in Côte d’Ivoire’s coup and violence that brought the current government 
into power (Zounmenou No date).
The obsession with saving the inherited neo-colonial State
It is clear that like the states that constitute it as an intergovernmental 
organisation, the AU is still trapped in state-centric approaches to peace, 
focusing more on rebuilding the state, that was never authentic in the 
first place, than on transforming society as a whole. It has been about 
establishing the semblance of a functioning nation-state in the form of 
governmental institutions for providing services and security rather than 
re-orienting citizenry or boosting indigenous civil society structures that 
form part of social capital for peace and development. Such rebuilding 
should ideally be linked to institution building, leadership development, 
citizenship enhancement, economic rejuvenation. At a practical level, the 
conf lict-resolution and peacekeeping components must be seen as the start 
to the post-conf lict reconstruction and development process. Post-conf lict 
does not mean that interventions start after conf lict has ended, but that 
the focus of intervention is measured by what happens after agreements are 
implemented fully. 
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Conclusion
The AU approach to peacebuilding has evolved over the past fifty years from 
the terrible experiences of the early OAU years to improved interventions 
in the later years of the OAU. The AU inherited the lessons learned and 
improvements begun under the OAU, but benefitted also from UN-driven 
ideas of holistic and comprehensive pursuit of peace and development. This 
has produced the following features that now characterise the particular 
nature of the AU approach to peacebuilding: 
•	 It is based on a holistic concept of peace that embraces all the elements of the 
UN Agenda for Peace (conflict prevention/anticipation, conflict resolution/
peacemaking, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction). 
•	 It comprises a comprehensive peace architecture that ranges from early 
warning capacity to post-conflict rebuilding for peace, but this remains 
underdeveloped mainly due to resource constraints and lack of political 
will on the part of African governments. 
•	 It uses a peacebuilding framework anchored on balance between 
continental leadership and regional responsibility for peace; but not all 
RECs are ready to give effect to this both in terms of capability and in 
respect of political will to act.
•	 It benefits from the growing participation of non-state actors in supporting 
state-driven peace processes; though this is far from enthusiastic on the 
part of governments and still suffers the weaknesses to do with donor-
driven civil society initiatives, neo-colonial suspicions, imposing models 
from Euro-American history, and a bias towards technical interventions. 
•	 Unique African historical experiences underscore the importance of 
fundamentally transforming the neo-colonised post-colonial state and 
its relations with the former colonial empires for permanent peace to 
take root. 
Factors that undermine the uniqueness of African peacebuilding include:
•	 Limited horizontal coordination and interface both among RECs and 
among individual countries in building sustainable peace;
•	 Over-reliance on external resources for peace building, thus limiting 
African ownership of initiatives;
•	 Failure to transform the inherited colonial state and economy as a 
necessary condition for building the fundamentals of decolonial peace. 
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The record shows that the AU interventions have been relatively successful 
in de-escalating conf lict and restoring the authority of the state, but they 
have not been successful in transforming the conditions that lead to an 
elusive colonial type of peace in Africa. Until the very idea of the modern 
nation-state on African soil (which is colonial in its DNA) is resolved, 
Africa will remain a mortuary where beautiful concepts and models of 
peacebuilding die, failing to bringing about lasting peace. The colonial 
state and modern society as inherited are founded on the paradigm of war, 
a logic of violence that does not die at independence. It is this underlying 
colonial/neo-colonial structure of violence that must be overcome for 
a truly authentic peace paradigm to emerge. In the meantime, the AU 
peacebuilding efforts need to encourage the interface between efforts from 
below and those from above, between state-driven and community-driven 
interventions, and between Eurocentric and Afrocentric peacebuilding 
models. The latter will ensure that there is greater harnessing of indigenous 
social capital and historical experiences as well as the customisation of 
peacebuilding to specific regional and local African realities. Research is 
urgently needed to explore this in some detail.
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